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INTRODUCTION
The Statement of Issues presente

nn appeal

Statement of the Case, the Statement ..:• i ? ne Facts, and the

brief and require no supplementation.

ARGUMENT
POINT I
THERE WAS NO SUBSTANTIAL CKLDIBLE EVIDENCE OF
EXPOSURE TO ASBESTOS DURING THE DECEASED
EMPLOYEE'S PERIOD OF EMPLOYMENT WI*n- TUT
AGAINST WHOM THE AWARD WAS MADE.

1

Defendants respond to plaintiffs1 first point regarding
the lack of evidence of Mr. Werner's exposure to asbestos at
Tisco between 1977 and 1982 by focusing on the tactual
testimony of Mrs. Werner, Mr. Collins, and Mr. Kinder.
Defendants contend the testimony of these witnesses shows
some exposure to asbestos during Mr. Werner's employment at
TISCO.

However, it is clear from the hearing transcript

that these witnesses gave no testimony to support a finding
regarding asbestos exposure at TISCO.
Mrs. Werner testified that she did not have complete
knowledge of the types of insulation products handled by
TISCO; but, she did state that the insulation was not
asbestos-based.

(R. 29)

Both Mr. Collins and Mr. Kinder

testified that, in 1970 or 1971, the Federal Government
banned the use of asbestos in insulation products.
(R. 50 Sc 74)

Mr. Kinder stated asbestos was very rarely

used in insulation after the ban.

(R. 74)

Mr. Collins

added that some asbestos-based material, including transit
pipe, was manufactured after the ban.

(R. 50)

However,

Mr. Collins testified he had no knowledge whether Mr. Werner
used asbestos-based transit pipe at TISCO Intermountain.
(R. 53)
Thus, none of the witnesses who appeared at the hearing
on this matter testified that Mr. Werner was exposed to
asbestos during his employment with TISCO.

Furthermore, the

defendants apparently concede that the offer of proof,
concerning the expected testimony of a witness who did not
2

appear, made by counsel for Mrs. Werner, was incompetent
evidence unable to support the award.
Finally, Mrs. Werner's attorney recognized at hearing
the weakness of any claim that Mr. Werner was exposed to
asbestos during his employment from 1977 to 1982 at TISCO.
Specifically, counsel for the widow states,
... I submit that after a review of both the
testimony of Mrs. Werner and talking to the son
and these two gentlemen here [Joseph J. Collins
and Darrell Kinder], as well as Dave McOmie, that
the possibilities of exposure to harmful
quantities was practically nil as far as TISCO
was concerned ... (R. 54)
Given the total lack of evidence of any exposure to
asbestos during Mr. Wernerfs employment at TISCO Intermountain,
the Industrial Commission's award of benefits against TISCO
should be reversed.

POINT II

ASSUMING THERE WAS EXPOSURE TO ASBESTOS DURING
THE DECEASED EMPLOYEE'S EMPLOYMENT WITH HIS
EMPLOYER, BENEFITS WERE AWARDED BASED ON
INSUFFICIENT EVIDENCE THAT SUCH AN EXPOSURE WAS
INJURIOUS.
Defendants respond to plaintiffs' second point
regarding the insufficiency of evidence that Mr. Werner's
alleged exposure to asbestos while at TISCO was not
injurious, by contending any exposure is injurious.
Initially, defendants state that the terms
"harmful" or "injurious exposure to the hazards of
employment" have not been addressed in opinions issued by
3

this Court.

Such a statement is in error.

This Court

considered the question of what constitutes sufficient
injurious exposure to an occupational disease in Uta-Carbon
Coal Co. v. Industrial Commission, 104 Utah 567, 140 P.2d
649 (1943).

Concerning alleged silicosis, the Court said

that there was no legislative definition as to what were
harmful quantities of silicone dioxide dust.

The Court then

laid down the following guidelines,
In the absence of legislative or medical
standards, in order to give effect to the Act,
the commission must determine what are harmful
amounts of silicon dioxide dust from the facts
of each individual case.
140 P. 2d at 651
Thus, legislative or medical standards of injurious exposure
must be considered, if available.
case may be applied.

Then, the facts of the

However, no matter what standard is

used, the statutory requirements of direct and proximate
causation set forth in Utah Code Anno., Sections 35-2-26 and
35-2-27(28) must be met in terms of the last injurious
exposure.
Recently, in Chadwick v. Industrial Commission, 572
P.2d 400 (1977), this Court applied medical as well as
factual evidence to rule on the compensability of an
allegedly injurious occupational exposure causing an eye
infection.

Analyzing the injurious nature of the exposure

in terms of causation, this Court noted that it was the
claimant's burden of proof to establish that there was a

4

direct causal connection between employment conditions and
the alleged occupational disease and, further, that the
employment was the proximate cause of the disease.

The

Court pointed out that the right to an occupational disease
award is created by statute and is dependent upon meeting
the requisites of the Occupational Disease Act.

Turning to

the claimant's argument, therein, that there was a
comparatively high risk of contracting the alleged
occupational disease through employment, this Court
indicated in Chadwick,
... the mere fact that it [the disease]
could have come from that source [employment]
or even that there is some likelihood that it
did so, does not compel a finding that that
was the fact.
582 P.2d at 402
Based on the foregoing, Mrs. Wernerfs contention
that any exposure could be harmful is without merit.

The

treatise cited by the Medical Panel indicates there is still
"consistent evidence11 that a very brief asbestos exposure
does not necessarily cause a substantial risk of
mesothelioma.

(R. 153)

Thus, given equivocal medical

evidence, if only a brief exposure to asbestos is proved
between 1977 and 1982, arguably, Mrs. Werner has presented,
at best, the same modicum of evidence showing a
"comparatively high risk11 of disease that was found
insufficient in the Chadwick case. Mr. Wernerfs exposure to
asbestos between 1977 and 1982 was not proved to be of a
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length or degree that could have actually caused
mesothelioma.

This argument is buttressed by the Medical

Panel Report which, in the plaintiffs1 view, stands for the
proposition that Mr. Werner's exposure to asbestos between
1947 and 1967 was the main cause of his methothelioma; and,
further, in terms of reasonable medical probability, Mr.
Werner's alleged exposure to asbestos at TISCO was not a
substantially contributing cause of his mesothelioma as
continuous exposure to asbestos greater than twenty years,
after 1967 herein, would not increase the risk of
development of malignant mesothelioma.

(R. 155, 156)

Absent proof of injurious exposure and causation,
an award against TISCO cannot be supported.

POINT III

THIS COURT HAS NO JURISDICTION TO CONSIDER
DEFENDANTS1 CONSTITUTIONAL ARGUMENTS AS
DEFENDANTS RAISE SUCH ISSUES FOR THE FIRST
TIME IN THEIR BRIEF HAVING FAILED TO FILE A
MOTION FOR REVIEW OR CROSS-APPEAL.
In the defendant's brief, a third point is raised
challenging the constitutionality of Utah Code Anno., Section
35-2-13 and Section 35-2-14, on the grounds that these
sections allegedly deny Mrs. Werner access to a forum to hear
and determine her rights guaranteed under the provisions of
Article 1, Section 11 and Article 16, Section 5 of the
Constitution of the State of Utah.
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The thrust of defendants f argument is that the
statutes of repose, which bar a claim for benefits against
Mr. Werner's prior employers, are unconstitutional because
they purport to deprive a worker of a cause of action before
it actually arises.

In this regard, the Administrative Law

Judge specifically found that a claim against Mr. Werner's
next prior employer, Mountain States Insulation, was not
actionable pursuant to Utah Code Anno. 35-2-13(b) (4) because
more than three years had elapsed between the date when
Mr. Werner last worked for Mountain States Insulation, 1976,
and the date of his dependent's occupational disease claim.
(R. 163)

Unfortunately, Mrs. Werner never filed a motion

for review challenging the administrative law judge's denial
of her claim against Mountain States Insulation, nor did she
file a cross-appeal in this Court from the Industrial
Commission's final order.

No one has suggested that there

is any limitations problem with Mrs. Werner's claim against
TISCO, which claim is the subject of this appeal.
Therefore, this Court has no jurisdiction to consider
defendants' argument that the statutes of repose, which the
administrative law judge relied upon in denying benefits
against the prior employer, are unconstitutional.
Considering briefly the merits of their argument,
defendants characterize Utah Code Anno., Section 35-2-13 and
Section 35-2-14, as "statutes of repose" which mandated the
filing of an occupational disease death claim, in this
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instance, before the dependent's cause of action arose.
Specifically, defendants state that, if the "last injurious
exposure11 were in 1967, Mrs. Wernerfs occupational disease
death claim would have to have been filed no later than
1970.

Such a contention is in error, not only regarding the

characterization of the named statutes as unconstitutional,
but, also in stating the time frame which, under the facts
of this case, a claim would have to be filed.
The code sections cited by defendants are not
unconstitutional as the two-part test of a valid statute of
repose announced by this Court in Berry v. Beech Aircraft
Corp., 25 Utah Adv. Rep. 30 (1985) is met.

That two-part

test indicates,
First, section 11 is satisfied if the law
provides an injured person an effective and
reasonable alternative remedy ,!by due course
of law11 for vindication of his constitutional
interest. The benefit provided by the
substitute must be substantially equal in
value or other benefit to the remedy
abrogated in providing essentially comparable
substantive protection to one's person,
property, or reputation, although the form of
the substitute remedy may be different. ...
Second, if there is no substitute or
alternative remedy provided, abrogation of
the remedy may be justified only if there is
a clear social or economic evil to be
eliminated and the elimination of a remedy is
not an arbitrary or unreasonable means for
achieving the objective.
Analyzing the first prong of the test, it is
evident that the Occupational Disease Act is constitutional,
vis a vis, Article 1, Section 11, as no common law right
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existed for a cause of action based on an occupational
disease.

As Arthur Larson indicates in his treatise on

workmenfs compensation, 1 Larson, Workmen's Compensation Desk
Edition, Sec. 41.20, p. 7-87,
... the concept of occupational disease was a
stranger to the precompensation-era common
law. To the extent that compensation acts were
thought of as substituting nonfault liability
for the kind of injuries that were potential
subject of fault liability, there was thought
to be no place for occupational diseases, which
(in the sense of a disease due to the ,fnormaln
conditions of the industry as distinguished
from the negligence of the employer) had
consistently been held incapable of supporting
a common-law action.
Thus, it is clear that the legislature did not fail
in providing a substitute remedy, in the form of the
Occupational Disease Act, which was substantially equal in
value to a remedy abrogated.

No remedy was abrogated.

A

no-fault system of compensating workers was established
where no avenue of recovery existed before.
Moving to the second prong of the test, no analysis
is necessary as no prior remedy has been abrogated.
However, compelling arguments can be put forward regarding
the social and economic justification of the Occupational
Disease Act.

As noted by this Court in Masich v. United

States Smelting, Refining and Mining Co., 113 Utah 101,
191 P.2d 612, 624-625 (1948), certain individual rights and
remedies can be made to yield to the public good,
The humanitarian principles of the occupational
disease act do overcome in part, the inadequacy
9

of relief at common law tor a class of
employees, and the act should not be discarded
because some members of the class have rights,
which may be adversely affected.
It should be remembered that our act is a
compulsory act and should be considered in the
light of the principle that the employer is
charged with liability regardless of fault ...

We are convinced the legislature, because of
the nature of the disease [silicosis], the
length of time for development, the difficulty
of proof, the inability to properly apportion
the negligence between employers, the cost and
expense of litigation and the small return to
the employee, decided to deal with silicosis
through the commission and to require both the
employer and the employee to shoulder part ot
the costs of occupational disease without
regard to the negligence of either.

This court cannot ignore or strike down an act
because it is either wise or unwise. The
wisdom or lack of wisdom is for the legislature
to determine. If the act is unjust, amendments
to correct the inequities should be made by the
legislature and not by judicial interpretation.
Obviously, in creating the Occupational Disease
Act, the legislature exercised its police power, as in the
workmen's compensation area.
14 of the

By contesting Sections 13 and

Act, defendants are in truth seeking to broaden,

through judicial interpretation, the employer's liability
for compensation and encroach upon the conditions where the
legislature intended no payments be made.

The legislative

formula giving rise to compensation should not be changed
through such a process.

Rather, as suggested in Masich,
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the benefit structure of the Occupational Disease Act should
be altered only by the legislature.
Turning to defendants1 analysis of when
Mrs. Werner's claim had to be filed herein, defendants
indicate, assuming there to be a last injurious exposure to
asbestos in 1967, 1970 was the latest a claim could be
filed.

This is in error.
Utah Code Anno. Section 35-2-13(b)(4) provides that

no compensation shall be paid for death from an occupational
disease unless death results within three years from the
last date upon which the employee actually worked for the
employer against whom compensation is claimed.

Mr. Werner

went to work for Mountain States Insulation in approximately
1965 or 1966 as an insulation mechanic.

(R. 27)

Mr. Werner stayed with Mountain States Insulation until 1977
when he formed his own company, TISCO Intermountain.
(R. 28)

Assuming Mr. Werner's last injurious exposure was

in 1967, the facts of this case support a valid occupational
disease claim against Mountain States Insulation until
approximately 1980, three years after Mr. Werner left his
employment with the company.

Two points must be made.

First, a compensable occupational disease death
claim is not possible under the facts of this case against
Mountain States Insulation since Mr. Werner's onset of
mesothelioma was in 1982.

But, second, considering

Mr. Werner's work history and the medical evidence in the
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record, a compensable occupational disease death claim
involving Mr. Werner could, in all probability, have
occurred under Utah law.

Mr. Werner started working in the

asbestos insulation industry in 1947.

(R. 28)

Assuming

injurious exposure to asbestos from 1947 to 1967, Mr. Werner
was at risk to develop mesothelioma, according to the
Medical Panel Report, from 15 to 50 years after his first
injurious exposure.

(R. 155)

Given the first injurious

exposure in 1947, the minimum latency period would put the
initial risk of developing mesothelioma 15 years later or in
1962.

Arguably, because of the possibility of longer

latency or because of continued exposure until 1967,
Mr. Werner remained at risk of developing a malignant
mesothelioma from 1962 until 1982. Applying Utah law to
this scenario, Mr. Werner had viable occupational disease
coverage regardless of fault, for 18 of the 20 years he was
at risk of developing mesothelioma.

Had his mesothelioma

developed between 1962 and 1980, Mr. Werner could have
successfully claimed benefits against Bullough's Insulation,
Owens Corning Insulation, and Mountain States Insulation.
The system of occupational disease compensation established
by the legislature did fail to extend coverage for
Mr. Werner's death, but, pursuant to Masich, the system need
not be perfect.

Substantial coverage was extended.
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CONCLUSION
There is no evidence before this Court that
Mr. Werner was exposed to any asbestos during his employment
with TISCO Intermountain.

Absent such evidence, Mr. Werner

could not have been harmfully exposed to asbestos during
such employment and there would be no possiblity of an
occupational disease death claim against said employer.
Given this lack of evidence, the Utah Supreme Court need not
consider any other issues raised by plaintiffs or
defendants.

The Industrial Commission's award of death

benefits against TISCO should be reversed.
If Mr. Werner was exposed to some small amounts of
asbestos during his employment with TISCO, as alleged by the
defendants, there was no proof that such an exposure was
injurious and causative.

Without this type of evidence, an

award against TISCO cannot be supported and must be
reversed.
This Court does not have jurisdiction in this
appeal to consider defendants1 constitutional arguments.
These arguments were raised by the defendants for the first
time in their brief.

Defendants failed to perfect these

issues for appeal by filing a motion for review before the
Industrial Commission or a cross-appeal before this Court.
DATED, this

xt '* day of

m ^ ^ u

, 1986.

DENNIS V. LLOYD
Attorney for Plaintiffs
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